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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNIFORM FIREFIGHTERS OF COHOES, 
LOCAL 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-17875 
CITY OF COHOES, 
Respondent. 
LOMBARDI, REINHARD, WALSH & HARRISON, P.C., for Charging Party 
ROEMER, WALLENS & MINEAUX, LLP (ELAYNE G. GOLD of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Firefighters) 
except to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued upon remand1 of this 
charge against the City of Cohoes (City). The Firefighters charge that the City violated 
§209~a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it insisted upon 
several allegedly nonmandatory subjects of negotiation during compulsory interest 
arbitration proceedings. 
vCity ofCohoes (hereafter Cohoes), 31 PERB P020 (1998), appeal dismissed 
as premature, 31 PERB U7017 (Sup. Ct. Alb. County1998) (appeal pending). 
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We held in our July 1998 decision and order that many of the City's demands 
were mandatorily negotiable2. Several, but not all,3 of the City's demands were held 
mandatorily negotiable under a supplemental theory of negotiability adopted for the first 
time in Cohoes. Under this conversion theory of negotiability, all of the legal terms 
contained in a collective bargaining agreement, no matter their inherent nature, are 
"terms and conditions of employment"4 for purposes of the collective negotiations 
between the parties to that contract. 
We also for the first time in Cohoes held mandatorily negotiable demands 
seeking to incorporate statutory language into a collective bargaining agreement so 
long as that statutory language embraces terms and conditions of employment and 
there are no policies prohibiting those negotiations. 
The last part of Cohoes involved the negotiability of demands seeking a waiver 
or modification of statutory rights. Demand 40, concerning a procedure to resolve 
General Municipal Law (GML) §207-a5 issues, was remanded to the ALJ for 
reconsideration under a new framework for analyzing the negotiability of such 
demands. To give effect to the Legislature's declaration that negotiations under the Act 
involve mutual rights and duties, we held that the negotiability of waiver demands made 
2Demand 42 was held a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
3Two of the City's demands were held mandatorily negotiable under traditional 
negotiability analysis, which examines the inherent nature of the subject proposed for 
negotiation. 
4Only these are subject to a duty to negotiate under the Act. 
5GML §207-a provides for the payment of salary, medical and hospital expenses 
of fire fighters who become disabled by injury or illness in the line of duty. 
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by employers upon unions had to be assessed according to the same standards which 
have been used to assess the negotiability of comparable demands by unions upon 
employers. Demands by either party to have a statutory right or privilege held by the 
other, or the persons it represents, waived or modified are mandatorily negotiable if the 
right or the privilege is a term and condition of employment "unless the waiver or 
modification proposed is against public policy or the bargaining has been foreclosed or 
the bargaining obligation has been lifted pursuant to a plain and clear expression of 
legislative intent."6 Recognizing that there could be close questions of public policy and 
legislative intent affecting the negotiability of any given waiver proposal, we remanded 
to permit the ALJ an opportunity to consider the Firefighters' claim that demand 40 
would result in the nonnegotiable waiver of several employee rights. 
The ALJ held demand 40 to be mandatorily negotiable in all respects. Finding 
demand 40 to be mostly procedural, the ALJ held that the several parts of demand 40 
challenged by the Firefighters either would not result in any waiver of rights7 or would 
631 PERB p020, at 3044. 
7Those parts requiring a ten-day notice of injury or illness and describing a light 
duty assignment. The ALJ also held that no rights were waived by the absence from 
the proposed GML §207-a procedure of a provision guaranteeing employees a due 
process hearing before benefits are terminated because that hearing was already 
required by judicial decisions construing GML §207-a. 
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effect a waiver sufficiently consistent with public policy and legislative intent8 to permit 
negotiations and consideration of the demands by the arbitration panel.9 
The Firefighters except to the ALJ's holding that demand 40 is mandatorily 
negotiable. It appears that the Firefighters argue that the ALJ erred both by adhering to 
Cohoes and in her application of that decision to demand 40. The Firefighters argue 
generally that a union cannot be compelled to negotiate about a demand calling for the 
waiver or modification of any statutory right of the employees it represents/More 
specifically, and as limited to the facts of this case, the Firefighters argue that a waiver 
or modification of employees' GML §207-a rights or benefits is either contrary to public 
policy or to the plain and clear expression of legislative intent found in GML §207-a. 
The City argues that the exceptions are untimely if and to the extent the 
Firefighters intend to except to our July 23, 1998 decision and order. Similarly, as the 
only issue before the ALJ on remand was the negotiability of demand 40, and the 
statutory waiver issues associated with that demand, the City argues that any 
exceptions to any other part of Cohoes are without basis. On the merits of the ALJ's 
decision, the City claims that demand 40 does not call for the modification, elimination 
or waiver of any employee's statutory rights which would be violative of any public 
policy or legislative intent. 
8Those parts authorizing the release of medical records and tax returns, creating 
an arbitration procedure to resolve disputes in lieu of any other action or proceeding 
and terminating GML §207-a benefits upon an employee's service retirement, 
accidental disability retirement or performance of duty disability retirement. 
9The ALJ observed that any arbitration award rendered might be challenged. 
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Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision except insofar as the ALJ held §6(a) of demand 40, calling for a 
termination of GML §207-a benefits upon an employee's retirement, to be mandatorily 
negotiable. Without reaching the public policy issues raised by §6(a) of demand 40, we 
hold that negotiations about that section are not required because GML §207-a, as 
interpreted, expresses the Legislature's plain and clear intention to exempt both unions 
and employers from any duty under the Act to negotiate or arbitrate a waiver of rights 
expressly conferred by GML §207-a. 
Before discussing the negotiability of demand 40, we note that the City is correct 
that the only exceptions properly before us are to the ALJ's decision upon remand. 
That remand was limited to the statutory waiver issue, as was the ALJ's decision. The 
Firefighters do not appear by the papers now before us to except to the other parts of 
our July 1998 decision and order. Rather, the language in its exceptions about that 
earlier decision are intended to preserve a right to appeal from the entirety of our July 
1998 decision and order. A judicial appeal has already been filed and pursued, but it 
has been dismissed as premature because the remand to the ALJ rendered our July 
1998 decision and order nonfinal.10 As we now decide the waiver issue left open upon 
remand, our decisions and orders of July and this date now become final for purposes 
of judicial appeal. 
We dismiss the exceptions to the extent the Firefighters argue that the ALJ 
should have disregarded our July 1998 decision and order and should have held that a 
10Only final orders are appealable under §213 of the Act. 
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union can never be required to negotiate about the statutory rights of the unit 
employees it represents. We rejected that proposition in our July decision and order. 
The ALJ was bound by that decision and had no discretion to disregard it. 
Turning to the merits of the ALJ's application of Cohoes, we affirm her decision 
in all respects except as to the negotiability/arbitrability of §6(a) of demand 40 
captioned "Termination of Benefits". The other parts of demand 40, as the ALJ found 
and held, either do not result in a waiver or a modification of any employee rights or 
effect a waiver which is either authorized or at least not prohibited by law or policy. 
Section 6(a) of demand 40, if negotiated or awarded by the interest arbitration 
panel, would terminate the benefits of GML §207-a due an employee upon the 
employee's retirement. In relevant part, GML §207-a.2 entitles a retiree to receive the 
difference between the amount received as a retirement allowance or pension and the 
amount paid others as regular salary or wages until that person reaches the mandatory 
retirement age or has performed the period of service required under law for the 
termination of services. This demand would result in the forfeiture of this salary 
differential. Although the City appears to argue that this is not the intent of its proposal, 
the ALJ was correct in concluding that the language of §6(a) would clearly effect a loss 
of this statutory right and it is the language of the demand which controls our analysis. 
We have often been presented with questions about the negotiability of demands 
related to the provisions of GML §207-a. In relevant respect, employers have been 
exempted from a duty to negotiate demands by unions concerning the express terms of 
GML §207-a and matters necessary to the implementation of those express statutory 
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provisions.11 GML §207-a has been held to constitute a comprehensive, integrated 
legislative scheme which plainly and clearly establishes the Legislature's intention to 
not require bargaining about such issues as a municipality's ordering an employee to 
light duty, requiring an employee to consent to the release of certain otherwise 
confidential medical records, and forcing an employee to submit to surgical and medical 
treatments.12 
A municipality's obligation to pay the salary differential is expressly stated in 
GML §207-a.2 and it is no less a part of this comprehensive legislative scheme than 
are the rights afforded the municipality vis-a-vis the injured or ill employee. As 
municipalities have been exempted from a duty to negotiate about the rights bestowed 
upon them under GML §207-a, then unions must be similarly released from a duty to 
negotiate demands seeking waivers of the rights GML §207-a expressly bestows upon 
the employees it represents. If bargaining over the express terms of GML §207-a 
pursuant to a union's demand upon an employer is disruptive of the statutory scheme, 
bargaining about those terms pursuant to an employer's demand upon a union can be 
no less disruptive of GML §207-a and no more required by the Act. 
As we emphasized in Cohoes, bargaining under the Act is intended to be mutual 
and reciprocal under rules which should be the same for both parties to a bargaining 
relationship. We would disregard the mutuality of bargaining rights and obligations we 
find so important to a reasoned administration of the Act if we were to require the 
"E.g., Schenectady Police Benv. Ass'n v. PERB, 85 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB 
1J7005 (1995), conf'gin part City of Schenectady, 25 PERB 1J3022 (1992). 
12/d. 
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Firefighters to bargain upon the City's demand for a waiver of an individual's express 
entitlement to the salary differential under GML §207-a.2 so long as the City enjoys an 
exemption from any comparable duty.to bargain waivers or modifications of its several 
rights and privileges under GML §207-a. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision on remand is affirmed, 
except that part holding §6(a) of demand 40 to be mandatorily negotiable and 
arbitrable. We hold §6(a) of demand 40 to be nonmandatory because GML §207-a 
reflects a plain and clear legislative intent to render at least nonmandatory a demand 
for a waiver or modification of the salary differential payments required by GML §207-
a.2. 
On the basis of this and our July 1998 decision and order, this charge is 
dismissed except as to Demand 42 and §6(a) of demand 40. Demand 42 and §6(a) of 
demand 40 are nonmandatory subjects of negotiation and the City is ordered to 
immediately withdraw those demands from consideration at interest arbitration. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: August 3, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, DUTCHESS 
COUNTY LOCAL 814, DUTCHESS COUNTY UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19936 
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of counsel), 
) for Charging Party 
IAN G. MAC DONALD, COUNTY ATTORNEY (KEITH P. BYRON of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Dutchess (County) to 
a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Dutchess County Local 
814, Dutchess County Unit (CSEA). CSEA alleges that the County violated §209-a.1(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed the 
co-payments required of unit employees for prescription drugs from $3.00 to $4.00 for 
generic drugs and from $5.00 to $7.00 for brand name drugs. On a stipulated record, 
) 
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the ALJ, relying on County of Yates (hereafter Yates),'1 held that the County had 
violated the Act as alleged. 
The County argues that the ALJ erred because Yates is distinguishable, the past 
practice was not changed and continuation of the prior co-payment rates was 
impossible because-the Mohawk Valley Physicians Health Plan (MVP), the HMQ 
through which the prescription plan is offered, stopped offering a plan with a 
$3.00/$5.00 co-pay effective January 1, 1998. 
CSEA argues in response that the ALJ's decision was correct under Yates and it 
should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties1 arguments, we reverse 
the ALJ's decision. We reverse because the stipulated record does not establish that 
the past practice was a co-payment for prescription drugs at a fixed cost to employees 
of no more than $3.00/$5.00. 
The County argues that the past practice was the extension to unit employees of 
a prescription drug plan through MVP at the lowest rate available from that HMO. 
CSEA argues that the past practice was a co-payment prescription drug plan with a 
fixed cost of $3.00/$5.00 without regard to the identity of the provider. If CSEA is 
correct, the County has arguably violated its duty to negotiate by purchasing a plan 
from MVP with a $4.00/$7.00 co-payment and providing that plan to unit employees. If 
the practice is as the County describes it, however, then there has not been a violation 
J 122 PERB 1J3017 (1989), aff'g 21 PERB 1J4604 (1998). 
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of the Act because the County is continuing its practice by offering the prescription drug 
plan with the lowest co-payment rates which MVP offers. The parties' stipulated record 
is at least equally susceptible to either description of the practice. In such 
circumstances, a charging party has not satisfied its burden to prove a change in 
practice and a charge alleging-a-refusal to negotiate grounded upon aunilateral change 
in terms and conditions of employment must be dismissed.2 
Although $3.00/$5.00 were the co-payment amounts in fact paid by unit 
employees from initiation of the prescription drug plan in 1990 through January 1998, 
that does not by itself establish that the benefit existing by practice was a co-payment 
at those rates only. The $3.00/$5.00 rates were the ones charged by MVP for that 
) period and by the parties' stipulation those rates were then "the lowest available from 
MVP". On January 1, 1998, MVP did not have a prescription drug plan with a 
$3.00/$5.00 rate. The lowest rates offered by MVP were $4.00/$7.00, which were 
extended to the unit employees by the County. Upon this record, the $3.00/$5.00 co-
payments may not themselves have been the practice, but merely the by-product of a 
practice of providing a prescription drug plan through MVP at the lowest rates that MVP 
offered at any given point in time. 
Yates is not to the contrary of our decision in this case. In Yates, there was a 
finding made on the facts of that case that the practice was a fixed co-payment rate. A 
past practice developed and existing within any labor-management relationship 
2E.g., County of Essex, 31 PERB fi3026 (1998). 
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regarding prescription drug coverage need not always be a fixed rate of co-payment as 
a matter of law. Yates is a fact specific decision. Indeed, both the ALJ's and the 
Board's references in Yates to Unatego Central School District (hereafter Unatego)3 
recognized that the nature and the extent of a past practice for purposes of the Act is 
most often established by thefacts of each particular case.4 In Unatego, for example,-it-
was found on the facts of that case that the practice was participation under an 
umbrella health insurance provider, not the continuation of a specific health insurance 
plan. Upon that finding, the Board held that the employer in Unatego had not changed 
its practice when it unilaterally substituted the Empire Plan for a GHI Plan because the 
substitute plan was included under the umbrella plan. Consistent with Unatego and 
Yates, we simply conclude that the stipulated facts in this case do not establish that the 
County's practice was to offer employees a prescription drug plan with a fixed co-
payment maximum of $3.00/$5.00. 
Having found that the charge must be dismissed because the stipulated record 
does not establish a unilateral change in practice, we do not consider any of the parties' 
other arguments. 
For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, the County's exceptions are 
granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
320 PERB fl3004 (1987), cont'd sub nom. Unatego Nonteaching Association v. 
PERB, 134 A.D.2d 62, 21 PERB fl7002 (3d Dep't 1987), mot. for Iv. to appeal denied, 
71 N.Y.2d 805, 21 PERB 1J7010 (1998). 
AAccord Genese-Livingston-Steuben-Wyoming BOCES, 29 PERB 1(3065 (1996), 
cont'd, 30 PERB ^7009 (Sup. Ct. Livingston County 1997). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 3, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Micferael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUBWAY SURFACE SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20145 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
STUART SALLES, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(DANIEL TOPPER of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Subway Surface Supervisors 
Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing 
its charge that the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) violated §209-a. 1(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when Leon Ravenel, a nonunit 
employee, performed unit work on May 30, 1998, at the Authority's Centralized 
Electronics Shop located in Woodside, Queens.1 The ALJ determined that the requisite 
1This case was consolidated for hearing with two other improper practice 
charges (U-19850 and U-19990) filed by the Association against the Authority. No 
exceptions to the ALJ's decision have been taken with respect to those cases. 
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exclusivity was lacking because Ravenel had regularly been performing unit work at 
Woodside since 1996. 
Ravenel is a Maintenance Supervisor 2 (MS2) who has been assigned to 
Woodside since 1995.2 At that time, he was the sole supervisor of 25 hourly employees 
in the title of Revenue Equipment Maintainer II. In 1996, Alex Grinman; a Maintenance 
Supervisor 1 (MS1), was also assigned to Woodside, on a part-time basis, to supervise 
the hourly employees. He became a full-time employee at Woodside in 1997. During 
1997, the hourly employees continued their electronics work and cleaned, repaired and 
built additional cubicles to accommodate the planned increase in hourly employees 
occasioned by the Authority's centralization of its electrical departments.3 In late 1997, 
17 hourly employees and another MS1, Jose Ponciano, were transferred to Woodside 
from the Car Equipment Department. In May 1998, 33 additional hourly employees 
from the Communications Department were assigned to Woodside, to work under the 
supervision of Ravenel, Grinman and Ponciano. Ravenel supervised Ponciano and 
Grinman and, along with Grinman and Ponciano, he continued to supervise the hourly 
employees. An MS1 or Ravenel supervised each shift, including the weekend shifts. 
2He succeeded another MS2 who had supervised the hourly employees at 
Woodside. 
3The record establishes that in 1997 the Authority began centralizing its electrical 
department by moving hourly employees who performed electrical functions (Electric 
Equipment Maintainers) from each of its separate departments to one centralized 
electronics shop at Woodside. These hourly employees, unlike other hourly employees 
supervised by the MS1s, are skilled employees who work individually in cubicles on 
assigned tasks as opposed to working on a group task as part of a work gang. 
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The record shows that Ravenel worked on Saturday, May 30, 1998, supervising hourly 
employees. The ALJ determined that the Association lacked exclusivity over that work 
at Woodside because Ravenel had been supervising hourly employees in tandem with 
unit employees. He further held that an earlier decision4 holding that supervision of 
hourly employees was exclusively Association bargaining unit work was limited to the 
facts of that case and, because the Authority had raised a new defense to the charge, 
the prior decision did not have collateral estoppel effect. 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in not 
giving preclusive effect to the earlier decision involving the Association's unit and in 
finding that the Association lacked exclusivity over unit work at Woodside. The 
Authority supports the ALJ's decision.5 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
In New York City Transit Authority, supra, the Association alleged that on 
numerous occasions, the Authority had assigned the work of an MS1, the title that the 
Association represents, to an MS2, a nonunit, unrepresented title. The ALJ in that case 
"New York City Transit Auth., 30 PERB 1J4654 (1997). 
5ln its response to the Association's exceptions, the Authority argues that the 
charge is untimely. The Authority did not raise timeliness as a defense in its answer to 
this charge. Therefore, although it raised timeliness in its brief to the ALJ, it waived any 
timeliness defense. Neither may the Authority raise timeliness in its exceptions when it 
was not properly raised before the ALJ. See Town of Hempstead, 26 PERB ^3063 
(1993). 
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dismissed many of the alleged instances of transfer as untimely. As to the allegations 
he found to be timely, the ALJ determined: 
[A]s applied to the allegations of the isolated incidents of 
transfers of unit work in June and August, I find that the 
supervision of hourly employees in work gangs is work 
exclusively performed by MS 1 employees.6 
That decision was limited to the incidents timely alleged to be violations of the Act in 
that case, which were different from those at issue here.7 The doctrine of collateral 
estoppel is not, therefore, applicable here because there is no identity of issues.8 
With respect to a unilateral transfer of unit work, the initial essential questions 
are whether the work has been performed by unit employees exclusively and whether 
the reassigned tasks are substantially similar to those previously performed by unit 
employees.9 While it was previously found that the Association had exclusivity over the 
supervision of work gangs of hourly employees, here, the Authority has at all relevant 
times assigned the supervision of these hourly employees to both unit employees, the 
MS1s, and to a nonunit employee, the MS2, in circumstances materially different from 
the prior case. 
6ld. at 4858. 
7The timely allegations in the earlier case did not involve any work done at 
Woodside and the work involved was the supervision of hourly employees in work 
gangs. 
8For collateral estoppel to have a preclusive effect, there must be an "identity of 
the issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action or proceeding." Ryan 
v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500 (1984). 
9
 Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985). 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Association's exceptions are denied and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 3, 1999 
Albany, New York 
fJohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
NEW WINDSOR, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20469 
TOWN OF NEW WINDSOR, 
Respondent. 
JOHN K. GRANT, ESQ., for Charging Party 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN AND O'REILLY (ALISON C. FAIRBANKS of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of New Windsor (Town) 
to an interim decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conditionally dismissing 
part of an improper practice charge filed by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of 
New Windsor, Inc. (Association) alleging that the Town had violated §209-a. 1(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The charge alleges that the Town 
issued General Order No. 98-3, in which it unilaterally imposed restrictions and 
conditions on off-duty employment of Town police officers, and thereafter refused 
demands to negotiate that change and its impact. The Town, in its answer, sought 
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deferral of the charge to the parties' contractual grievance procedure, which ends in 
binding arbitration.1 
After the pre-hearing conference, the ALJ accepted briefs on the deferral issue. 
Thereafter, the ALJ, relying on our decisions in Town ofCarmel2 and Herkimer County 
BOCES,3 conditionally dismissed that part of the charge dealing with the unilateral 
change, finding that Articles lll(A)(4) and XI4 of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement were applicable to the Association's allegation that the Town had unilaterally 
1The parties' collective bargaining agreement has the term of January 1, 1994 
through December 31, 1996. However, Article XVI 1(A)(3) of the agreement provides 
that if no contract settlement has been reached by midnight December 31, 1996, the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement will remain in effect until such time as a 
new contract is negotiated. 
229PERB 1J3073 (1996). 
320PERB H3050(1987). 
4Article 111(A)(4) reads: 
The Town will not diminish or impair, during the terms (sic) 
of this agreement, any benefits or privileges provided by law, 
rule or regulation for Police Officers without prior notice to 
the P.B.A. and when appropriate, without renegotiations with 
the P.B.A. 
Article XI reads: 
In order to maintain harmonious and cooperative relationships between 
the Town and its Police Officers, it is hereby declared to be 
the purpose of this grievance procedure to provide an 
application of and interpretation of this collective bargaining 
agreement. Grievance shall mean any alleged violation, 
mis-interpretation(sic), or inequitable application of this 
contract and the terms and conditions of the employment of 
employees. 
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changed terms and conditions of employment. The ALJ determined that the allegations 
concerning the refusal of demands to negotiate the change and the impact of the 
change would be further processed. 
The Town has filed exceptions seeking a review of the ALJ's decision that the 
refusal to negotiate both the change and the impact of the change should be further 
processed. Recognizing that its exceptions to a conditional dismissal are really an 
interlocutory appeal from an interim decision, and cognizant of our policy with respect 
to accepting interlocutory appeals,5 the Town further argues that there are 
extraordinary circumstances which warrant our consideration of its appeal at this 
juncture.6 The Town argues that the entire improper practice charge should have been 
deferred because the refusal of the demands to negotiate the change and the impact of 
the change are "part and parcel" of the unilateral change allegation. To further process 
the refusal to negotiate allegations at PERB while the unilateral change allegation is 
before an arbitrator would, the Town argues, require it to litigate the same facts and 
issues in two forums, contrary to the policies of the Act and our deferral policy. 
5The ALJ's decision conditionally dismissing the charge as to the unilateral 
change allegation is not final. The Town's exceptions to that interim decision are, 
therefore, properly characterized as an interlocutory appeal. Pursuant to §212.4(h) 
(formerly §204.7) of our Rules of Procedure, which was amended effective July 21, 
1999, appeals from rulings of an ALJ on motions or objections made during the 
processing of a charge or at the hearing may not be taken directly to the Board unless 
expressly authorized by the Board. 
6The Association has not filed any response to the Town's exceptions. 
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We do not usually review rulings of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) or an Administrative Law Judge until such time as all 
proceedings have been concluded.7 This policy is designed to prevent the delay 
inherent in piecemeal review and the potential prejudice resulting to the parties 
therefrom. We have granted permission for an interlocutory appeal only in a few eases 
presenting extraordinary circumstances. We grant permission to review the ALJ's 
ruling in this case for two basic reasons. 
First, the appeal is warranted at this time because it raises novel and important 
issues regarding our deferral policy.8 
Second, permission to appeal is also appropriately granted because the ALJ's 
ruling cannot be adequately reviewed at a later stage in the proceedings. Analogy is 
appropriately made to rulings involving a consolidation of cases, where we have 
regularly granted permission for interlocutory appeals from rulings consolidating 
charges.9 In consolidation cases, if we were to reverse a ruling on appeal after a 
hearing, our decision would be meaningless. Review at the conclusion of the 
consolidated proceedings would, if reversal occurred, require us to either order no relief 
7See Council 82, AFSCME, 32 PERB 1J3040 (1999); Watertown City Sch. Dist, 
32 PERB H3022 (1997); United Transp. Union, Local 1440, 31 PERB 1J3027 (1998); 
Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB j[3050 (1996); State of New York (Div. of Parole), 25 
PERB lf3007(1992). 
5Council 82, AFSCME, supra. 
9New York State Housing Finance Agency, 30 PERB p022 (1997); Greenburgh 
No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3034 (1995); County of Nassau, 22 PERB 
113027(1989). 
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or to direct the parties to conduct hearings again on a severed basis. We have not 
considered either alternative to be acceptable. 
A similar rationale is applicable in this case. The ALJ's ruling requires the Town 
to proceed simultaneously in two forums: arbitration and an improper practice hearing. 
If, on appeal from the ALJ's final decision, we were to reverse the ALU's ruling thatthe 
allegations grounded upon the refusals to negotiate pursuant to demand were not to be 
deferred, the result would be meaningless because we could not cancel out the hearing 
that would have already taken place before the ALJ. 
Addressing the merits of the ALJ's ruling, the Town argues that the refusal to 
negotiate allegations are "part and parcel" of the unilateral change allegation which he 
ordered deferred to arbitration. If the remaining two allegations are processed under 
the improper practice charge, the parties will also be litigating whether a unilateral 
change occurred because the alleged unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment is an inseparable part of the allegations resting on the refusals to negotiate 
pursuant to demand. Facts bearing upon the disposition of the bargaining demand 
allegations will also likely be presented in the arbitration of the unilateral change 
allegation. It serves no useful purpose to have the same facts litigated twice in 
separate hearings, even if some of the legal issues are different to an extent. The 
interests of the parties and the policies of the Act are equally well served by a deferral 
of all of the allegations. 
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In State of New York (SUNY Health Science Center),™ we did not require the 
deferral of the bad faith negotiations aspect of a charge which included a unilateral 
change allegation. In that case, however, the bargaining misconduct allegations were 
wholly unrelated to the unilateral change allegations. Here, the bargaining demand 
allegations, which the ALJdid not order deferredrare inextricably intertwined with the 
unilateral change allegation, which was deferred. The Town's alleged refusal to 
negotiate pursuant to demand cannot be fully litigated without there being litigation 
concerning the meaning of the contract terms in issue both in the grievance arbitration 
and in the improper practice charge. In such circumstances, there is no persuasive 
reason not to defer the refusal to negotiate allegations along with the unilateral change 
allegation. As we noted in State of New York (SUNY Health Service Center):^ 
Our merits deferral policy is grounded upon the belief that the policies of 
the Act favoring an accommodation of the parties' contractual dispute 
resolution procedures are generally advanced by deferral of the merits of 
certain charges when an interpretation of an expired agreement, which is 
a reasonably arguable source of right to the charging party, is necessary 
to the disposition of the merits and an award rendered under a binding 
grievance arbitration procedure is potentially dispositive of the charge. 
In deferring the entirety of the allegations in the charge, we provide the arbitrator, 
under the parties' consensual procedure, with the opportunity to decide the contract 
questions central to the disposition of the improper practice. That decision may well be 
dispositive of the charge. However, nothing in this decision precludes the Association 
1030PERB H3019(1997). 
uld. at 3043. 
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from seeking to reopen the improper practice charge upon the grounds set forth in 
Town of Carmel.^2 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ's decision is reversed insofar as it does not 
conditionally dismiss the alleged refusal by the Town to negotiate pursuant to the 
Association's demands. The entire charge is, therefore, conditionally dismissed subject 
to a motion to reopen should the Town successfully raise in the grievance arbitration 
context any argument which forecloses a determination regarding the merits of the 
Association's grievance or should any award not satisfy the Board's deferral standards. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 3, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
:2Supra, note 2. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF LLOYD POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4891 
TOWN OF LLOYD, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Lloyd Police Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-4891 - 2 -
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective.negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All part-time and full-time police officers, investigators/detectives 
and sergeants, 
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Town of Lloyd Police Benevolent Association. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 3, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
bhn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF LLOYD POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4892 
TOWN OF LLOYD, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Lloyd Police Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-4892 - 2 -
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All part-time dispatchers, 
Excluded; All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Town of Lloyd Police Benevolent Association. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 3, 1999 
Albany, New York 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROXBURY HIGHWAY WORKERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4897 
TOWN OF ROXBURY, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Roxbury Highway Workers Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
Certification - C-4897 - 2 -
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All employees of the Town Highway Department, 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Roxbury Highway Workers Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 3, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michafe17R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
